Recently a new and very serious vulnerability in the SSL 3.0 protocol has been discovered that allows an attacker to recover sensitive information for an encrypted session. The Qualys SSL Labs server test has been updated to identify and warn about this issue.
Figure 1 – Qualys SSL Labs Server Test Score for TMG Published Secure Web Site
On a Forefront TMG server with SSL hardening implemented as I’ve outlined here and here, the POODLE attack is mitigated, but it is still recommended that you disable SSL 3.0 altogether. SSL 3.0 is an old, outdated protocol that is no longer widely used, and disabling it should have minimal impact on clients connecting to secure web sites published by the Forefront TMG 2010 firewall.
To disable SSL 3.0 on the TMG firewall, open an elevated PowerShell window and execute the following commands:
New-Item -Path “HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols\SSL 3.0\Server” -Force
New-ItemProperty -Path “HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols\SSL 3.0\Server” -PropertyType dword -Value 0 -Name Enabled
Note: Use caution when copying/pasting the above commands as wrapping of the text has occurred.
A restart of the server is required for the change to take effect.
When Microsoft announced the formal end-of-life for Forefront TMG 2010, they laid out in clear detail the support boundaries for the product going forward. Microsoft stated specifically that they would continue mainstream support for TMG until April of 2015, and extended support would terminate in April 2020. However, the Web Protection Service (WPS) updates for the URL filtering database, antimalware signatures, and the Network Inspection System (NIS) would only continue until December 31, 2015.
Unfortunately, it appears that Microsoft has abandoned the updating for NIS signatures. You may have noticed that a fully updated Forefront TMG firewall with the latest signature updates shows that the last NIS signature was released for security bulletin MS12-050 on July 20, 2012!
I find it difficult to believe that there hasn’t been a single vulnerability discovered or hotfix released since July of 2012 that wouldn’t benefit from NIS protection, so I have to assume that Microsoft is no longer supporting NIS in spite of their pledge to provide support for WPS through the end of 2015. If you are relying on NIS for essential network protection, it’s time to consider deploying a dedicated IDS/IPS solution or another solution that provides this functionality.
Last year I wrote an article for ISAserver.org that provided detailed guidance for improving security for SSL and TLS protected web sites using Forefront TMG 2010. Many people have reached out to me recently to ask about enabling forward secrecy, which my original article did not include because, at the time, it was not recommended to enable it. However, as times have changed, it is now recommended to enable forward secrecy so I recently wrote a short post with guidance on how to do that. The post was written with a very narrow scope and addressed only the enabling of forward secrecy for TLS. Many of you have since asked for guidance on overall security best practices with regard to SSL and TLS along with adding support for forward secrecy. In addition to the configuration changes detailed in my original ISAserver.org article, I also recommend the following list of SSL and TLS cipher suites be explicitly enforced using the method outlined here.
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256_P256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256_P384 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256_P521 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384_P384 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384_P521 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256_P256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P256 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256_P256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384_P256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA_P256 TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA_P256 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
Using this configuration, the Forefront TMG 2010 firewall should receive an A rating from the SSL Labs test site (at the time of this writing).
Enabling and supporting the above list of cipher suites will provide the best overall protection and performance for your SSL protected web sites. Note that the list above does not include support for SSL 3.0. If you need to support SSL 3.0 you should add the following cipher suites to the end of the list.
Please note that this configuration may not work with older browsers on old, unsupported operating systems, for example Internet Explorer 6 on Windows XP. Before deploying this configuration in production I would encourage you to conduct some testing with your supported clients to ensure operability.
Last year I wrote an article for ISAserver.org that outlined in detail how to improve SSL and TLS security for web sites published using Forefront TMG 2010. In its default configuration, Windows Server 2008 R2 and Forefront TMG leave quite a bit to be desired in terms of SSL and TLS security. In the article I demonstrated how to dramatically improve the security posture of TMG when publishing web sites that use SSL and TLS. At the time I wrote the article it was not recommended to enable forward secrecy, so the changes I originally proposed resulted in an “A” score from the Qualys SSL Labs test site. However, times have changed since then, and with the recent revelations of wide spread government spying, it is now recommended to enable forward secrecy by default. Sites that don’t support forward secrecy will now receive a reduced grade.
To accomplish this on the Forefront TMG 2010 firewall, open the Local Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc) and navigate to Computer Configuration, Administrative Templates, Network, SSL Configuration Settings. Double-click SSL Cipher Suite Order and choose Enabled. Copy the list of SSL cipher suites to a blank notepad document and then move all of the cipher suites that begin with TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_ to the front of the list. Use caution here because the list cannot have any extra commas, line breaks, or spaces at all. Paste the updated list back in to the SSL Cipher Suites box and click Ok.
The server will have to be restarted for the changes to take effect. Once complete, forward secrecy will now be used by modern browsers and you should once again receive an “A” grade from SSL Labs.
Hotfix rollup 5 for Microsoft Forefront TMG 2010 with Service pack 2 (SP2) is now available for download. This latest hotfix rollup includes fixes for the following issues:
KB2963805 - Account lockout alerts are not logged after you install Rollup 4 for Forefront TMG 2010 SP2
KB2963811 - The Forefront TMG 2010 Firewall service (wspsrv.exe) may crash when the DiffServ filter is enabled
KB2963823 - “1413 Invalid Index” after you enable cookie sharing across array members in Forefront TMG 2010
KB2963834 - HTTPS traffic may not be inspected when a user accesses a site through Forefront TMG 2010
KB2967726 - New connections are not accepted on a specific web proxy or web listener in Forefront TMG 2010
KB2965004 - EnableSharedCookie option doesn’t work if the Forefront TMG 2010 service runs under a specific account
KB2932469 - An incorrect value is used for IPsec Main Mode key lifetime in Threat Management Gateway 2010
KB2966284 - A zero value is always returned when an average counter of the “Forefront TMG Web Proxy” object is queried from the .NET Framework
KB2967763 - The “Const SE_VPS_VALUE = 2″ setting does not work for users if the UPN is not associated with a real domain
KB2973749 - HTTP Connectivity Verifiers return unexpected failures in TMG 2010
You can download hotfix rollup 5 for Forefront TMG 2010 SP2 here. After applying this update, the new Forefront TMG 2010 build number will be 7.0.9193.644.
Today, Microsoft announced the end of life for the Forefront UAG 2010 product. Microsoft will continue to provide mainstream support for UAG until April 14, 2015, and extended support until April 14, 2020. Existing customers with active Software Assurance on their existing UAG licenses as of December 1, 2013, may add new UAG server instances, users, and devices without having to purchase additional UAG licenses. In addition, existing customers who have purchased Forefront UAG server licenses will be given upgrade rights to Windows Server 2012 R2, which provides some of the remote access features found in Forefront UAG. For example, Windows Server 2012 R2 supports DirectAccess, client-based VPN, and reverse web proxy with new Web Application Proxy role.
With regard to license upgrade rights, users are entitled to a Windows Server 2012 R2 license for each Forefront UAG server license (or External Connector license) they currently own. Software Assurance for UAG can still be purchased until January 1, 2014. Forefront UAG 2010 will be removed from the pricelist on July 1, 2014. Forefront UAG 2010 will continue to be available from Microsoft OEM hardware partners like Celestix Networks for the foreseeable future, however.