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Identifying and Reducing Anonymous Traffic Allowed by Forefront TMG 2010
My recent blog post about altering the SafeSearch enforcement rule in Forefront TMG 2010 to require authentication has sparked some discussion on Twitter and Facebook regarding unauthenticated, anonymous access, particularly to resources located on the public Internet. In a perfect world (ok, my perfect world!), all access to and through the TMG firewall would be fully authenticated. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, this isn’t achievable. To start, authenticating all traffic to and through the TMG firewall would necessitate that all clients be configured as explicit web proxy clients. In addition, if non web-based protocols are allowed by firewall policy the Firewall Client would need to be distributed to all clients. While this is ideal if we’re designing a solution on paper, in the real world many administrators don’t have the luxury of forcing proxy configuration or installing the Firewall Client on all their systems. For example, some systems may not be under the administrator’s control or they may be required to support non web-based protocols on platforms other than Windows, for which the Firewall Client is not supported. Also, as veteran ISA and TMG firewall administrators know all too well, there are some applications that simply don’t play nice with an authenticating proxy, even with the Firewall Client installed. Applications that don’t leverage Winsock for network communication or that use IP-based protocols such as ICMP or GRE also prevent us from realizing our goal of authenticating all network traffic through TMG. Windows Update traffic also poses challenges for authenticating all TMG traffic, as the Windows Update service often makes requests to the Internet for updates in the background and perhaps even if there is no interactive user logged on.
Just because out of necessity some traffic has to be allowed through the TMG firewall anonymously doesn’t mean that undertaking an effort to reduce unauthenticated traffic isn’t a worthwhile project. If you’re interested in doing something like this, have a look at the Fastvue blog and read Scott Glew’s excellent article detailing how to use TMG Reporter to identify and reduce unauthenticated traffic on the Forefront TMG 2010 firewall. Not using TMG Reporter? You’re missing out! Download a free evaluation here!
Forefront TMG 2010 Protocols and Ports Reference
When deploying Forefront TMG 2010 as a forward or reverse proxy, many organizations will place their TMG firewalls in a perimeter or DMZ network to provide an additional layer of protection for their proxies. When deployed in this manner, configuring perimeter firewalls to allow proper communication to and from the Forefront TMG firewall can be challenging. Although the Service Overview and Network Port Requirements for Windows document on TechNet includes information about ISA server (which also applies to TMG) it includes all protocols and ports used by TMG in all deployment scenarios. This can be confusing when you simply want to allow TMG firewalls in a perimeter network to communicate with an Enterprise Management Server (EMS) on the internal network, or simply manage a TMG firewall in a perimeter network from a management workstation on the internal network. Opening all of the ports listed in the Microsoft KB article mentioned above would be unnecessary and would violate the principle of least privilege, which dictates that only the specific ports required for communication should be opened.
Note: This reference covers typical TMG configurations and may not include all protocols and ports required for every deployment scenario. For example, if you are using RADIUS or RSA for authentication, have configured connectivity verifiers or a remote SQL server, or have deployed Forefront TMG 2010 for Exchange integration, each of these configurations will require additional perimeter firewall access. Also, don’t forget that your perimeter firewalls will need to allow access to the protocols and ports required for the services you are accessing/publishing through Forefront TMG 2010.
For reference, here are the protocols and ports required for specific, common Forefront TMG 2010 deployment scenarios:
EMS to TMG
TCP 135, 10000-65535* – RPC
TCP 3847 – MS Firewall Control
TMG to EMS
TCP 445 – CIFS
UDP 445 – CIFS
TCP 2171 – MS Firewall Storage (domain-joined only)
TCP 2172 – MS Firewall Storage Secure (workgroup mode only)
TCP 3847 – MS Firewall Control
TMG to DCs
Domain joined…
TCP 88 – Kerberos
UDP 88 – Kerberos (send receive)
UDP 123 – NTP
TCP 135, 49152-65535* – RPC
TCP 389 – LDAP
UDP 389 – LDAP
TCP 445 – CIFS
UDP 445 – CIFS
TCP 3268 – LDAP Global Catalog
Non domain-joined…
TCP 389 – LDAP (required only for pre-authentication in reverse proxy scenarios)
TCP 636 – LDAPS (required only for pre-authentication in reverse proxy scenarios)
TMG to DNS
TCP 53 – DNS (send receive)
UDP 53 – DNS
Primary EMS to Replica EMS
TCP 135, 49152-65535* – RPC
TCP 2173 – MS Firewall Storage Replication
Replica EMS to Primary EMS
TCP 135, 49152-65535* – RPC
TCP 445 – CIFS
UDP 445 – CIFS
TCP 2171 – MS Firewall Storage – domain-joined only
TCP 2172 – MS Firewall Storage (Secure) – workgroup mode only
TCP 3847 – MS Firewall Control
Web Proxy Client to TMG
TCP 80 – HTTP (WPAD only)
TCP 8080 – HTTP Proxy
Firewall Client to TMG
TCP 80 – HTTP (WPAD only)
TCP 1745 – Firewall Client Control Channel
UDP 1745 – Firewall Client Control Channel
TCP 1024-65535 – All high ports**
UDP 1024-65535 – All high ports**
Management Workstation to TMG
TCP 135, 10000-65535* – RPC
TCP 2171 – MS Firewall Storage – Domain mode only
TCP 2172 – MS Firewall Storage (Secure) – Workgroup mode only
TCP 3847 – MS Firewall Control
*The default dynamic port range for Windows Server 2008 R2 is 49152-65535. When TMG is installed this setting is changed to 10000-65535. This does not apply to TMG EMS, however. RPC can be configured to use a smaller range of dynamic ports, if necessary. For more information, please see Microsoft KB 154956.
**The Forefront TMG 2010 Firewall Client is designed to operate without a firewall between itself and the TMG firewall. It is highly recommended that you avoid this design whenever possible. If this is unavoidable, all TCP and UDP high ports will have to be opened, as the TMG Firewall Client control channel utilizes random high ports and cannot be restricted as RPC can.
Addressing Security Issues with PPTP VPN in Forefront TMG 2010
At the recent DEFCON hacking conference, security researchers demonstrated a method to crack the MS-CHAPv2 authentication protocol with a 100% success rate. MS-CHAPv2 is used as the default authentication method for remote access VPN in Forefront TMG 2010.
With the public availability of tools to automate the cracking process, PPTP communication using MS-CHAPv2 should be considered unencrypted. There are two options available to mitigate this concern: disable MS-CHAPv2 and enable EAP with PPTP, or disable PPTP and switch to a more secure remote access VPN protocol such as L2TP/IPsec or SSTP. Enabling EAP requires the use of smart cards or certificates for authentication which makes implementation more challenging. SSTP is an excellent option as it leverages SSL/TLS to protect the MS-CHAPv2 authentication process. However, SSTP is only supported on Windows Vista SP1 and later clients. L2TP/IPsec is another good choice, and although it does support certificates it can also be configured using a pre-shared key. If long, complex passwords are used and care is taken to ensure that the password is well protected, it can provide a secure remote access solution.
Windows 8 Security from End to Edge And Beyond
It is with great pleasure that I can announce I have recently signed on with Syngress to be the technical reviewer for Tom Shinder and Yuri Diogenes’ new book about Windows 8 security. I’ve been spending a lot of time over the last few months getting to know Windows 8, both server and desktop. Until now I’ve been focused mostly on new features, specifically around the core networking and remote access capabilities (which are exceptional!). Working on this book with Tom and Yuri will be an excellent opportunity to learn about all of the wonderful new security features of the latest Microsoft operating system. As a network security specialist and former information security engineer for a Fortune 100 financial services institution, I’m hoping I can provide helpful and meaningful feedback to these two experienced and talented authors. I’ll post more details about the book when I can share them. Until then, watch this space as well as Tom and Yuri’s blogs for latest news about this new book!
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